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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is developed around the set of design principles for executive 
compensation contracts as outlined in the study of Shan and Walter (2014). We 
propose guidance for determining an appropriate CEO starting compensation level 
based on past performance and the market for managerial talent. We also outline 
factors to be considered in determining annual changes to CEO compensation. 
This paper argues that stock options and restricted stock grants should become 
exercisable only upon meeting both time and performance criteria against an 
appropriate benchmark peer group. We agree with Shan and :DOWHU¶V (2014) 
recommendations regarding termination payments and make suggestions on how 
to apply these recommendations in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses recent developments in executive compensation literature and presents 
a number of recommendations regarding the structure of CEO contracts that we believe can 
maximise firm value and benefit shareholders. Shan and Walter (2014) identify the need to 
reconsider the design principles of CEO contracts in public firms after the recent controversies 
surrounding executive compensation. This controversy frequently stems from complaints about 
excessive CEO compensation that cannot be justified by company performance and a perceived 
inability of boards to provide effective monitoring (Kaplan, 2013).  
Competition among firms for hiring talented outside managers has substantially increased in 
recent years. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) show that the competition among firms is particularly 
intense for CEOs with relative prior experience and transferable skills. They suggest that the 
increased importance in general managerial skills can explain the documented increase in executive 
compensation. Moreover, they find that a higher number of CEO vacancies are filled with external 
hires and that the compensation of internally promoted CEOs is lower than that of CEOs hired from 
outside their firm. Along the same lines, Frydman (2005) argues that the shift in importance from 
firm-specific skills to more general managerial skills has resulted in higher CEO compensation and 
increased inequality among top managers within a firm. Since excessive executive compensation 
and inequalities within a firm can have an adverse impact on shareholder value, a set of principles is 
needed for optimal executive compensation contract design. 
Against this backdrop, the focus of our analysis is to start with the appointment of a new 
CEO and determine how pay should initially be designed.  We then move through the CEO tenure 
cycle as base pay grows with experience but incentive compensation is set to match the ILUP¶V risk 
profile and investment opportunity set. We end with a discussion of optimal termination pay terms 
for departing CEOs. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our proposal for the estimation of 
appropriate CEO compensation; Section 3 discusses those factors that drive changes in executive 
pay; and Section 4 provides recommendations about equity-related compensation. Section 5 
discusses termination payments to outgoing CEOs and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Setting the Level of Total Compensation 
A crucial question with respect to the design of executive compensation is how to define its 
optimal level. Only then, can the appropriate structure of the compensation elements (cash, 
performance-bonus, equity-related compensation etc.) be considered. Although long term incentives 
should result in future value creation, research has shown that there is a positive ex-post relationship 
  
between the level of CEO compensation and firm size, but little link between CEO compensation 
and firm performance, no matter how the latter is measured (Izan et al., 1998; 2¶1HLO and Iob, 1999; 
Merhebi et al., 2006). These findings can collectively be interpreted as evidence of suboptimal 
contracting decisions that destroy shareholder value. 
Building on Shan and :DOWHU¶V (2014) second principle that base pay should take into 
account the market for managerial talent, we offer suggestions on how this can be operationalized in 
practice. We offer proposals for both internally promoted CEOs and externally hired appointments. 
Our base position is that an arbitrary upper limit in CEO compensation will likely result in a 
competitive disadvantage since the most skilful CEOs will eventually be hired by competitors who 
are willing to compensate talented CEOs more generously.  
We identify two key benchmarks for setting the base pay of an internally promoted CEO. 
First, the new CEO can be offered the same remuneration package paid to his predecessor. 
Alternatively, the new &(2¶V remuneration package can be set in line with the median CEO pay of 
the appropriate risk-adjusted benchmark group. The first approach is problematic if the departing 
CEO had a long-tenure and exercised soft power over the remuneration committee. It also assumes 
no major restructuring of the firm such that the skill set demanded of the incoming executive is 
comparable to that of the outgoing manager. The second approach better identifies a fair market rate 
for incoming CEOs, but creates a potential ratcheting effect when using the benchmark median and 
raises concern over how to identify the appropriate risk-adjusted benchmark (see Bizjak et al., 2008; 
Bizjak et al., 2011).  
For externally hired CEOs, the level of compensation account for the H[HFXWLYH¶V previous 
performance. If the newly appointed CEO has been hired from more junior positions elsewhere 
(CFO, COO, etc) an appropriate starting point for base pay would again consider the departing 
&(2¶V base pay and the median CEO pay for the peer benchmark group. However, firms should 
retain flexibility for higher pay to induce managers to leave secure jobs and compensate for 
unvested equity based compensation that the executive must surrender on leaving their current 
employer. This is especially likely to be the case where new CEOs are to be hired from larger firms, 
and where junior executive positions offer salaries comparable to the CEO position at the current 
firm. If the newly appointed CEO was a CEO at another firm, a starting point for base pay would be 
previous salary plus a premium to attract the candidate to the firm. This premium should be 
increasing with corporate size and risk (stock price volatility, financial distress, threat of takeover).  
In both cases, and on the assumption that new CEOs are appointed from publicly traded 
companies, past performance of the newly appointed CEO is an observable variable. Abnormal 
stock price performance (in relation to set peers) during the H[HFXWLYH¶V tenure should be used to 
  
determine the contribution of the new CEO to firm value. As is the case with any statistical model, 
the larger the available sample (years of CEO working experience) the more accurate the outcome 
will be. The discounted contribution of the CEO to firm value will then be used to calculate a 
premium or discount on CEO compensation relative to the appropriate risk-adjusted benchmark. 
Clearly, these proposals are subject to two important limitations. First, it is not easy to 
attribute changes in a ILUPV¶ market value to the decisions and actions of one individual, even if it is 
the CEO.  This is particularly relevant where the newly appointed CEO was a junior executive at 
their previous firm. Second, the underlying factors that affect company performance may be quite 
different compared to the firm the CEO comes from. Both issues highlight the need for newly hired 
CEO pay to be set with reference to an appropriate risk adjusted benchmark group. 
 
3. Annual Changes in Executive Compensation 
Even if an agreement is reached with regard to the level of CEO compensation, an equally 
important task is to determine the rate at which CEO compensation should change. Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005) show that executive compensation in US firms during the period 1993-2003 has 
increased more than can be justified by factors such as growth in firm size and other performance 
measures. In this section, we build upon principles 2, 4, and 8 of Shan and Walter (2014) to discuss 
annual changes in executive compensation. However, rather than focus on bonus payments, we 
centre our discussion on annual revisions to CEO base pay. In doing so, we identify two non-
mutually exclusive reasons for revision to CEO base salary. First, executives should be awarded for 
strong performance through annual increases in base salary. Second, executives should receive 
increases in base salary in light of annual pay reviews against their appropriate benchmark peer 
group of CEOs. We identify these areas as related given the findings of Bizjak et al. (2008) that 
CEOs who receive annual pay increases above the benchmark median have performed better than 
their peers. 
The work of Bizjak et al. (2008) and Bizjak et al. (2011) highlights the importance of Shan 
and :DOWHU¶V (2014) eighth principle surrounding the use of an independently selected group of peer 
firms against which benchmark pay is set. In line with extant literature, this benchmark can be a 
portfolio of matched firms with similar characteristics (e.g. industry, size, book-to-market, risk 
etc.). The need for independent identification of peer firms is highlighted in Bizjak et al. (2011), 
who show that firms can be opportunistic in the selection of peer firms in order to boost CEO 
compensation. The severity of this issue is most pronounced amongst non-S&P 500 firms who 
selectively benchmark against larger firms to boost CEO compensation given the known size bias in 
CEO compensation packages (see e.g. Merhebi et al., 2006).  
  
Unfortunately, independence in the selection of peer firms is problematic and responsibility 
is typically designated to the independent directors in a remuneration committee, and in 
consultation with outside consultants. Given the potential for conflict of interest in these 
transactions, we add to Shan and :DOWHU¶V eighth principle with a requirement that peer groups 
should be disclosed in the annual report.  Bizjak et al. (2011) find that disclosure of peer group 
firms reduces the bias of remuneration committees in the selection of peer group firms. 
Following the identification of an appropriate benchmark group, we suggest that CEO pay 
should not increase annually or over a rolling three-year period by more than the percentage 
increase in share price. The rationale is that director compensation should not increase 
proportionally by more than their contribution to firm value. We propose a three-year rolling period 
so as to avoid concerns over introducing convexity to executive payoff functions. Convexity in 
executive remuneration rewards managers for sub-optimally risky investments decisions that have 
the potential to generate large gains and losses from one year to the next. Executive base pay is 
unlikely to be cut from year to year, and so short-term incentives that offer little or no cost for 
failure should be limited. Thus, if the stock price has increased but failed to outperform the 
benchmark, an executive should not be rewarded with an increase in compensation. If a skilful CEO 
can consistently make positive (above benchmark) contributions to firm value, wealth should rise 
substantially along with that of the shareholders.   
 
4. Equity-Related Compensation 
A key purpose of incentive compensation should be to link changes in CEO wealth to 
changes in shareholder wealth, both in the short- and long-run. When a firm is expected to make 
investment decisions that affect its cash flows in the longer term, CEO remuneration should be 
based on more long-term incentives with higher pay-performance sensitivity. In this way, CEO 
wealth will be more closely related to the future impact of strategic investment decisions, and aligns 
their interests with those of the shareholders. This argument is consistent with Smith and Watts 
(1992) who note that when a large proportion of the future value of a firm depends on investment 
opportunities, executive remuneration packages are expected to include a higher percentage of 
incentive compensation.  
The effectiveness of incentive compensation as a mechanism to mitigate agency costs has 
been the subject of extensive research in the US, where equity-related pay is a fundamental 
component of executive compensation. Datta et al. (2001) find that firms that award a high 
proportion of equity-based compensation to their managers experience superior long-term stock-
price performance. Similar evidence is presented by Murphy (1999), Core et al. (2003), and Zhao 
  
(2013). Empirical findings regarding the relation between firm performance and incentive 
compensation in non-US firms are more limited and less conclusive. Coulton and Taylor (2002) 
show that CEOs are awarded with a higher percentage of stock options relative to their total 
compensation following a year of superior stock price performance. Matolcsy et al. (2009) argue 
that when stock options are used as a reward for past performance, a negative relation is expected 
between stock-based compensation and firm market value. However, their results do not provide 
support for this hypothesis. In contrast, they find a statistically positive relation between stock-
based compensation and firm market value when stock options are used as incentives for future 
performance.  
The value of stock-based compensation in a &(2¶V portfolio should also depend on firm risk 
characteristics in the context of the wider investment opportunity set. There is extensive evidence 
that equity-linked compensation is positively related to risk-taking activity via the increased 
convexity of payoffs stemming from executive stock options (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; 
Cohen et al., 2013; Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). Inducing managers to take risk can have a 
substantial positive impact on firm value, since risk-averse managers who are not sufficiently 
incentivized via their compensation may forgo profitable risky investments (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
However, excessive exposure to risk can also have the opposite impact on firm value. Therefore, the 
volume and value of equity-related incentives should be determined by the optimal level of risk 
exposure. 
Whether incentive compensation can mitigate agency costs in the long-run depends upon the 
conditions under which equity-related grants become exercisable. Following Shan and :DOWHU¶V 
(2014) seventh principle that performance bonuses should be higher for statistically superior 
performance, we propose that stock options and restricted stock grants should become exercisable 
not only by time but also under the condition of abnormal performance relative to the peer group 
benchmark. Doing so ensures that the size of award is contingent on firm level benchmark-adjusted 
performance than can be directly attributed to the H[HFXWLYH¶V tenure as CEO. 
In line with our discussion in section 3 on changes to executive base pay, Morse et al. (2011) 
show that powerful managers can manipulate the choice of performance measures towards those 
criteria they perform best against, thereby rigging the incentive contract. In firms with powerful 
CEOs and low board independence, earnings-based performance measures that can be manipulated 
through changes in accounting policies should be avoided. We augment our contribution to 
principle eight in Shan and Walters (2014) to suggest that the performance criteria should be 
independently set and disclosed in the remuneration committee report to minimise selection bias 
concerns in Bizjak et al. (2011). 
  
These performance measures should also be independent from prior year performance. If 
prior year performance is used as a benchmark for the following year compensation, executives 
may deliberately follow a course of action that would reduce earnings to avoid a large increase in 
their performance target next year. This is in line with the fourth recommendation of Murphy and 
Jensen (2011) in their study of bonus plans design. 
 
5. Termination Packages 
Principle 9 of Shan and Walter (2014) states that termination payments should be a function 
of benchmark-adjusted performance during the tenure of the executive and that a CEO who is 
dismissed for poor performance or inappropriate/illegal conduct should receive no termination 
bonus. This assessment of termination pay is consistent with )DPD¶V (1980) view that termination 
pay is a mechanism for ex-post settling up. 
However, companies do not pay termination simply to reward outgoing managers for failure 
and it would be difficult to limit these contractual payments to departing CEOs in practice. For 
example, Stanley 2¶1HDO received a reported $161.5 million termination package following his 
departure from Merrill Lynch in 2007 following significant losses on sub-prime investments, as 
well as allegations that he attempted to sell the company to Bank of America without previously 
consulting the ILUP¶V board. While Mark +XUG¶V reputed $34.5million payoff from Hewlett-Packard 
is smaller in absolute terms, media coverage suggested the firm should have withheld the 
contractual payment following allegations of inappropriate conduct by the outgoing CEO that led to 
dismissal in the first place. The figures involved in these cases are exceptionally high but they 
highlight that companies award termination pay because the type of gross misconduct that equates 
to inappropriate or illegal conduct is often difficult to prove. 
Yermack (2006) shows that CEOs receive high termination packages upon exit, the majority 
of which are discretionally awarded by the board of directors. He also reports a negative price 
reaction to the announcement of termination agreements in the case of voluntary CEO termination. 
Rau and Xu (2013) show that ex-ante severance agreements are more frequently used when the 
executive has weaker job security, and that firms largely base ex-post severance payments on ex-
ante contractual terms. Goldman and Huang (2012) find that one third of departing CEOs receive 
severance pay in excess of the contractual entitlement, with an average value of $8million. The 
authors conclude that for normal CEO retirements, severance pay represents a failure of corporate 
governance. However, with involuntary CEO departures, excess termination pay increases the 
likelihood of a smooth transition from a poorly performing departing CEO to a more capable 
replacement. Against this backdrop, we propose that failing to award severance pay following poor 
  
performance could disrupt the CEO succession process and make an alternative proposal to limit the 
size of these payoffs. 
Under the UK Corporate Governance Code, firms are advised to limit director service 
contracts to a one year rolling period. This limits the base component of severance pay to one year 
of salary and benefits. This reform was a direct response to severance payments of between three 
and five \HDU¶V salary under long-term notice periods. The recent departure of Philip Clarke from 
Tesco highlights the benefit of these limitations. Mr Clarke was dismissed following a period of 
poor accounting and stock price performance. Following his departure, the company subsequently 
aimed to withhold payment during his contractual notice period following allegations of 
misstatement of accounting earnings. Despite these allegations, Tesco were unable to prove the 
gross misconduct required to withhold the contractual entitlement. However, because of the one-
year notice period Mr &ODUNH¶V payoff was limited to £1.2 million plus the value of unvested long-
term incentive plans. As such, we recommend an addition to Shan and :DOWHU¶V (2014) ninth 
principle and suggest that director service contracts should be limited to one-year rolling periods 
and that base severance pay be capped at salary and benefits during the contractual notice period. 
We also propose that such payments should be adjusted should the executive find new employment 
during the notice period. 
We also propose that any discretionary awards and retirement settlements, as well as 
acceleration equity based compensation vesting terms should be subject to shareholder approval at a 
general meeting. These payments should be disclosed on an itemised basis in the remuneration 
committee report, rather than as a single line item for severance pay. Boards should retain the 
existing vesting period for equity-based pay so as to ensure that outgoing executive remuneration 
remains tied to performance following their departure. This contrasts with Shan and :DOWHU¶V (2014) 
view that incentive payments that have been earned but not yet vested should vest on resignation. 
Maintaining the existing vesting period of these incentives would limit the scope for managers to 
engage in short-term decision making to boost profits at the point of departure at the expense of 
long-term investment. This would also prevent boards from camouflaging large amounts of 
compensation that public firms pay to executives in the form of retirement benefits (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004).  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
We believe that the general design principles for executive compensation contracts outlined in Shan 
and Walter (2014) are in the correct direction.  However, we make a number of additional 
recommendations to supplement and operationalize these principles to optimise their impact. We 
  
also identify distinct issues and time periods in the CEO life cycle and apply the pay principles of 
Shan and Walter (2014) to these circumstances. 
In this paper, we present some basic principles for the estimation of CEO compensation level 
upon appointment that take into consideration competition in the market for managerial talent and 
prior experience. These are consistent with the design principle outlined in Shan and Walter (2014).  
Regarding changes in CEO compensation, we suggest that these should not be higher than 
the &(2¶V contribution to firm value on a rolling basis, after controlling for the performance of a 
risk-adjusted benchmark group. This supports Shan and Walter (2014) and we make some 
suggestions surrounding the selection and disclosure of the appropriate benchmark group to restrict 
ratcheting effects and selection bias in the choice of peer group. 
We propose that stock options and restricted stock grants should become exercisable upon 
meeting both time and performance related criteria and that these criteria should be demonstrably in 
excess of the performance benchmark. Additionally, we offer suggestions to ensure performance 
criteria should be carefully selected and the level of ILUP¶V risk be taken into consideration. This 
follows recent research on selection bias and choice of performance criteria in executive 
compensation. 
We propose some practical guidance to limit the perceived rewards for CEO failure. While 
we agree with the sentiment of Shan and Walter (2014), we expect that identifying the type of gross 
misconduct that would allow firms to refuse to pay contractual severance in cases of poor 
performance or inappropriate conduct will be difficult to implement in practice. Given this, we 
make recommendations to limit the term of director service contracts and conditions under which 
equity based compensation can vest in order to minimize severance pay surrounding involuntary 
CEO succession. 
We accept though that optimal levels and structure of executive compensation are not easy to 
be achieved at first attempt. It is quite likely to take some time and as stated by Matolcsy et al. 
(2012), can be part of a learning process which may entail errors and omissions by the firm. 
However, we are convinced that by following the general principles presented by Shan and Walter 
(2014) and in this paper, this process can be smoother and lead to stronger incentives for skilful 
managers to act in the best interests of shareholders.  
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